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We develop a model of computation as an unbounded process, measuring complexity by
the number of observed behavioural changes during the computation. In a natural way, the
model brings effective unbounded computation up to the second level of the Arithmetical
Hierarchy, unifying several earlier concepts like trial-and-error predicates and relativistic
computing. The roots of the model can be traced back to the circular a-machines already
distinguished by Turing in 1936. The model allows one to introduce nondeterministic
unbounded computations and to formulate an analogue of the P-versus-NP question. We
show that under reasonable assumptions, the resource-bounded versions of deterministic
and nondeterministic unbounded computation have equal computational power but that
in general, the corresponding complexity classes are different (Pmind ( NPmind).
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Computation is arguably the most basic form of information processing. In the philosophy of computation, it is often
understood as transforming information by some repeated systematic process, without constraining this a priori much
further. For example, Goldreich [9] describes computation as ‘a process that modifies an environment by the repeated
application of a predetermined simple rule’, and suggests that it can apply equally to a wide variety of processes in ‘natural
reality’ and to the human-defined or -created processes in ‘artificial reality’, where he associates the latter with the world
of computers and automation.
It follows that there are many more conceivable starting points for modelling computation than the time-tested
approaches initiated more than seventy years ago by Turing [24] and his contemporaries, departing from the intuitive
notion of a computer (human or machine) that computes function or numbers in finite time. In particular, computational
mechanisms today aim at a rather different and broader range of tasks and feature properties like interactivity (with
external agents), non-uniformity of program (learning and extension) and unbounded operation over time instead, as crucial
characteristics of their functioning [26]. In this paper, we make a special study of computation as an unbounded process.
1.1. Model
In typical computer applications nowadays, the core mechanism is amulti-process system that is always up and running.
Control goes from process to process and, whenever a process has its turn, the process computes until it executes an
instruction that explicitly transfers control to another process. It is this mechanism that we will study and appraise
computationally. As we will be interested in tracing the computation globally, we will delineate one process as the ‘base
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Table 1
Approaches to unbounded computation.
Model of computation Level Reference year
Non-terminating circular a-machines Σ2 ,Π2 Turing [24] 1936
Number-theoretic predicates Arithmetic sets Kleene [14] 1943
Oracle Turing machines Arithmetic sets Turing citeTuring1939, Post [16] 1939
Trial-and-error predicates ∆2 Putnam [18] 1965
Limiting recursion ∆2 Gold [7] 1965
Iterated limiting recursion ∆k Schubert [21] 1974
Alternating Turing machines Arithmetic sets Chandra et al. [2] 1976
ω-Turing machines NA Cohen & Gold [3] 1978
Tae-computability Σ2 Hintikka & Mutanen [12] 1998
Infinite time Turing machines Hyperarithmetic sets Hamkins & Lewis [11] 2000
Accelerating Turing machines NA Copeland [4] 2002
Relativistic computing ∆2 ,Σ2 Etesi & Nemeti [6,29] 2002
SAD computers Arithmetic sets Hogarth [13] 2004
Zeno machines NA Potgieter [17] 2006
Display Turing machines ∆3 Rovan & Steskal [20] 2007
Red–green Turing machines Σ2 ,Π2 , Arithmetic sets this paper 2010
process’ (presumably the process in which the machine will attempt to ‘stabilize’ after any internal run) and all other
processes as ‘transient processes’ (presumably meant as processes for passing through some subtasks).
Abstracting further, the core mechanism can be viewed as consisting of two processes: the ‘green process’ (the base
process) and the ‘red process’ (the collective transient processes), and control switching between the red and the green
process as dictated by the computation inside the processes. Using the Turing machine as basic underlying architecture,
this leads to the notion of red–green Turing machine, which is an ordinary offline Turing machine with the internal states
partitioned into red states and green states. The red–green machine has a 2-way read-only input tape and an unbounded,
i.e. potentially infinite work tape as usual. Computations on a red–green machine begin with a finite word w on the input
and the input head positioned on the left-most square of the input tape, and themachine in a fixed initial state which is red.
After starting, the red–green machine computes ad infinitum, modelling the action of the red and green processes. Without
loss of generality we assume that the machine never blocks.
To complete the model, we need a way to observe the behaviour and progress of the computation. Instead of counting
time or space, we will keep track of the system by the number of process switches. We do so by logging these switches on
a special one-way, write-only output channel: the machine writes ‘red’ when it switches to a red state, and green when it
switches to a green state. (Recall that the machine always begins in a red state.) The machine does not log anything as long
as it stays within states of the same colour. Consequently, the last colour written on the output always tells the colour of the
state we are currently in.
Switching from red to green or vice versa can also be interpreted as a mind change of the machine. The notion of mind
change is derived from the theory of machine learning, and we will see several connections with this later on [8]. The
terminology was also used by Putnam [18] in developing his notion of trial and error predicates, which are a source of
inspiration for this paper. Mind changes are a form of (weak) complexity measure, as we expect a machine to more quickly
reach some conclusion the fewer mind changes it needs for it. At the same time, we will see that red–green TMs are a
concretemodel for the notion of relativistic computing [6,29,28], which gives the latter amore concrete place in computing.
Table 1 shows the range of alternative approaches to unbounded computation which have been proposed over the years
and which, in many cases, are easily simulated by red–green TMs.
Most interesting, however, is the fact that the notion of computation as an unbounded process as we distinguished it can
be traced back to the discussion of the so-called automatic machines (or: a-machines) in Turing’s fundamental 1936 paper
[24]. Whereas the vocabulary and notational style were different, we will argue that the non-terminating version of, what
Turing called, circular a-machines, coincides quite precisely with red–green computation [27]. Our study thus seems to fill
a gap that existed since then.
1.2. Concepts
We first consider deterministic red–green machines.
Definition 1. A Turing machineM is called a red–green Turing machine if its set of internal states Q is partitioned into two
subsets, Qr and Qg , andM operates without halting. Qr is called the set of red states, Qg the set of green states. The initial
state ofM is assumed to be red.
To quantify the study of red–green machines, we will make use of the framework of recognizable sets. The following
definition relates to the notion of limiting recursion due to Gold [7], extending it to the framework of machines.
204 J. van Leeuwen, J. Wiedermann / Theoretical Computer Science 429 (2012) 202–212
Definition 2. LetM be a red–green TM.
(i) A word w ∈ Σ∗ is said to be recognized byM in (precisely) k mind changes if the unbounded computation ofM on
inputw eventually stabilizes in green (i.e. stays in green states forever) after having made exactly kmind changes.
(ii) A wordw ∈ Σ∗ is said to be recognized byM ifw is recognized byM in some finite number of mind changes.
(iii) The set of strings (language) L ⊆ Σ∗ recognized byM is the set L = LM = {w|w is recognized byM}.
Definition 3. A set of strings L ⊆ Σ∗ is said to be recognizable within k (or, a bounded number of) mind changes if and only
there exists a red–green TMM that recognizes every word w ∈ L within at most k (or, a fixed bounded number of) mind
changes.
In the definitions we might also wish to speak of sets recognizable in the limit, as the red–green TM operates forever and
we may not know for certain by just observing it for a finite time when it has stopped ‘changing its mind’. Also, the strings
recognized byM are not necessarily all recognized within the same number of mind changes.
A red–green TM can reject a stringw in twoways: either it eventually stabilizes in red, or does not stabilize on any colour
at all (thus making an unbounded number of mind changes as the computation proceeds). We make a difference between
red–green TMs that ‘merely’ operate as recognizer and those that operate as acceptor. In the latter case, we assume that the
machine does not admit any computations in which it makes infinitely many mind changes.
Definition 4. LetM be a red–green TM. The set of strings (language) L ⊂ Σ∗ is said to accepted byM if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
(a) L = LM = {w|w is recognized byM}.
(b) For every word w ∉ L, the computation of M on input w eventually stabilizes in red. (In this case we say that w is
rejected.)
It is easy to see that if a set L ⊆ Σ∗ is accepted by a red–green TM, then so is its complement. Red–green TMs that accept
(or reject) their inputs will be called red–green TM acceptors. An equivalent of Lemma 1 does not clearly hold for acceptors
(as one may have to preserve blocks of red states). The following fact follows easily. (Recall that a 2-r.e. set is any set that is
the difference of 2 recursively enumerable sets.)
Lemma 1. LetM be a (deterministic) red–green TM, L ⊆ Σ∗ a set of strings.
(i) If L is recognizable byM within a computably bounded number of mind changes, then L is acceptable by a red–green TM.
(ii) Let Lk (necessarily k odd) be the set of strings recognized byM in exactly k mind changes. Then Lk is a 2-r.e. set.
Proof. Part (i) follows by first computing the bound and then keeping count of the number of mind changes with a separate
subroutine of the machine, in a separate counter. The bound can be used to limit the number of mind changes needed to
make non-accepting computations rejecting, e.e. convergent to red. Part (ii) follows by writing Lk = Ak − Ak+1, where Ak is
the set of stringsw on whichM makes at least kmind changes. Ak is recursively enumerable for every k ≥ 1 (modifyM so
it stops in a final state exactly when it makes the k-th mind change). 
No further details are needed to explain red–green TMs. They are perhaps the simplest model for unbounded
computation, rooted in multi-process computation. We will show in Section 2 that red–green TMs recognize precisely
the sets in Σ2 sets and accept precisely the sets in ∆2. Red–green TMs also allow for a direct interpretation of the Ershov
hierarchy [5] and a machine proof of Post’s theorem for ∆2 ([15], Thm IV.1.16). Thus, the simple model of multi-process
system computation brings us already in a natural way up to the second level of the Arithmetical Hierarchy, well beyond the
domain of classical effective computation and yielding a recursion-theoretic viewofmany approaches to hypercomputability.
For preliminaries from recursion theory we refer to [15,19].
1.3. Results
Amajor aim of this study is to analyse the effect of nondeterminism onmind change complexity. Importantly, the model
of red–green TMs allows us to introduce nondeterminism in a natural way into the realm of unbounded computations. All
we need is to allow the underlying TM to be nondeterministic. We may assume w.l.o.g. that a nondeterministic red–green
TM always has one or two options available per instruction, never more or less.
Definition 5. LetM be a nondeterministic red–green TM. Awordw ∈ Σ∗ is said to be recognized byM in (precisely) kmind
changes if at least one ofM’s unbounded computations on input w eventually stabilizes in green (i.e. stays in green states
forever) after having made exactly kmind changes.
The other definitions related to recognition, and the recognized set of strings byM remain unchanged. Also the notion of
recognizability in the limit carries over to the nondeterministic case in the usual form.
We will be interested in the difference in quality between deterministic and nondeterministic red–green TMs, in terms
of the number of mind changes they may need towards a certain goal. It leads to the following definitions, which maybe be
indexed by any special subclass of red–green TMs one likes to consider.
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Definition 6. Consider the operation of red–green TMs, let f : N→ N be a function.
(i) MIND[f ] is the class of languages recognized (accepted) by deterministic red–green TMs within a number of mind
changes bounded by f (n).
(ii) ND_MIND[f ] is the class of languages recognized (accepted) by nondeterministic red–green TMs within a number of
mind changes bounded by f (n).
It will clear what is meant by MIND[F ] and ND_MIND[F ] for suitable classes of functions F . For example, we may
be interested in polynomially bounded simulations, if they exist. (We will also be interested in the relation between
deterministic and nondeterministic convergence in the limit.)
Definition 7. Consider the operation of red–green TMs.
(i) Pmind(= MIND[poly]) is the class of languages recognized (accepted) by deterministic red–green TMs within a
polynomially bounded number of mind changes.
(ii) NPmind(= ND_MIND[poly]) is the class of languages recognized (accepted) by nondeterministic red–green TMs within a
polynomially bounded number of mind changes.
While nondeterministic red–green TMs can always be simulated effectively by deterministic red–green TMs, we will
prove:
Theorem A. There is no computable function f such that, if L is recognized by a nondeterministic red–green TM within k mind
changes, then L can be recognized by a deterministic red–green TM within f (k)mind changes.
Wewill show that there are various reasonable types of nondeterministic red–green TMs that canbe simulated efficiently,
i.e. which have behaviours that can be simulated deterministically without needing too many extra mind changes for it.
Nevertheless, a typical side result of our analysis will be:
Theorem B. Pmind ≠ NPmind.
The model of red–green TMs makes computation-in-the-limit accessible for an analysis of the concrete computational
behaviours of this phenomenon, under a variety of typical constraints as they are known in other models of computation.
2. Basic facts for red–green TMs
In this section we summarize a number of basic facts for red–green TMs. The observations capture the recognition
capabilities of the machine and are implicit in several related results, but they find a slightly generalized form here.
2.1. Definitional remarks
The definition of red–green TMswasmotivated by the operation of multi-process systems. On the other hand, red–green
TMs can be seen as a type ofω-TM on finite inputs with a recognition criterion based on some property of the set(s) of states
visited (in)finitely often, in the tradition ofω-automata (cf. [23]). In particular, red–green TMs precisely correspond toω-TM
with a Rabin-type recognition criterion: an infinite run of the TM on input w is recognizing if and only if (a) no red state is
visited infinitely often and (b) some green states (one or more) are visited infinitely often.
Most interesting, however, is the fact that the notion of computation as an unbounded process as we distinguished
it can be traced back to the discussion of the so-called automatic machines (or: a-machines) in Turing’s 1936 paper [24].
Properly designed a-machines could well be circle-free, e.g. if their task would be to output infinite sequences of binary
digits representing computable reals. Turing noted that there may be machines, which he called circular, which at some
point stop producing outputs, i.e. which altogether produce only a finite number of output bits. Whereas a machine may be
circular because it stops after finitely many steps, there is the option of being circular while not terminating. Omitting the
formal details, we quote from [27]:
Theorem 1. Let A be a non-terminating circular a-machine, letM be a red–green Turing machine, let f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be
a partial function. Then f is computed byA if and only if f is computed byM performing f (x)mind changes.
2.2. Computational power of red–green TMs
Red–green TMs certainly have a far greater reach in computational power than classical TMs. At the base however, there
is the power of ordinary TMs.
Lemma 2. A set of strings L is recognized by a red–green TM within one mind change if and only if L ∈ Σ1, i.e. if L is recursively
enumerable.
206 J. van Leeuwen, J. Wiedermann / Theoretical Computer Science 429 (2012) 202–212
Proof. Let L be the set of strings recognized by a red–green TMM within one mind change. L is seen to be r.e.: design a TM
that enumerate all possible inputs, simulates and dovetails the computations ofM on these inputs, and outputs string w
wheneverM makes its first mind change (if any) during the computation onw.
Conversely, if L ∈ Σ1 and N is the TM that enumerates L, then design a red–green TM that on input w simulates the
computation ofN in red but switches to greenwhenw appears in the enumeration. Themachine precisely recognizes L. 
If more mind changes are allowed, the full power of red–green machines is unleashed. Note e.g. that the complement
of every r.e. set L, which is not necessarily r.e. again, is always red–green recognizable. For, let TM N recognize L. Design
a red–green TMM that operates on inputs w as follows: starting in red, the machine immediately switches to green and
starts simulatingN onw. IfN halts (thus recognizingw), the machine switches to red and stays in red from then onward.
It follows thatM precisely recognizes, in fact accepts, the set L.
With various pieces of evidence from existing theory, the following result offers itself as a characterization of the
computational power of red–green TMs in general. Part (ii) is related to Putnam’s characterization of trial and error
predicates ([18], Theorem 1).
Theorem 2. Consider red–green TMs.
(i) Red–green Turing machines recognize exactly theΣ2 sets of the Arithmetical Hierarchy.
(ii) Red–green Turing machines accept exactly the∆2 sets of the Arithmetical Hierarchy.
Proof. Let L be the language recognized by an red–green TMM. Design a recursive predicate F(x, y, w)with the following
semantics:
with x denoting an integer, if y represents the computation ofM on inputw for a number of steps that is greater than
or equal to x, then y proceeds only in green states from step x onward.
Such a predicate clearly exists. It follows that L ∈ Σ2 because w ∈ L ⇔ ∃x∀yF(x, y, w). IfM accepts language L, then the
complement machine recognizes L¯. It follows in this case that both L ∈ Σ2 and L¯ ∈ Σ2, thus L ∈ Π2, hence L ∈ ∆2.
Conversely, if L ∈ Σ2, then there exists a recursive predicate F(x, y, w) such that w ∈ A ⇔ ∃x∀yF(x, y, w). Now w ∈ L
can be recognized by a red–green TMM that operates as follows. The machine starts in red, and carries out the following
phases for all x in order, one after the other:
Phase x:
– switch to green
– check whether ∀yF(x, y, w) by going through all possible strings y in order and evaluating F(x, y, w).
– if a y is encountered for which F(x, y, w) does not hold, then stop checking, switch to red, exit this phase (and thus
move on to the next phase, with the next value of x).
Obviously, there exists an x such that for all y predicate F(x, y, w) is satisfied, if and only if themachinewill onlymake a finite
number of mind changes before settling in one phase forever (thus in green). It follows that, by definition, L is recognized
by the red–green TMM.
If L ∈ ∆2, then there exist recursive predicate F(x, y, w) and G(x, y, w) such that w ∈ L ⇔ ∃x∀yF(x, y, w) and
w ∈ L¯ ⇔ ∃x∀yG(x, y, w). Now design a red–green TM M that operates as follows on input x. Again the machine starts
in red, and carries out phases for all x in order, one after the other:
Phase x:
– switch to green
– check whether ∀yF(x, y, w) by going through all possible strings y in order and evaluating F(x, y, w).
– if a y is encountered for which F(x, y, w) does not hold, then stop checking F and switch to red,
– check whether ∀yG(x, y, w) by going through all possible strings y in order and evaluating G(x, y, w)
– if a y is encountered for which G(x, y, w) does not hold, then stop checking (and thus move on to the next phase
and switching to green with the next value of x).
Because w ∈ L or w ∈ L¯, there must be some finite x such that ∀yF(x, y, w) or ∀yG(x, y, w). Consequently,M must enter
a phase eventually in which it stays put, necessarily after at most finitely many mind changes, recognizing w when w ∈ L
and stabilizing in red whenw ∈ L¯. Thus L can be accepted by a red–green machine. 
Theorem1 shows the extent of red–greenmachines, but is also helpful in proving concrete sets of strings to be inΣ2 (∆2).
Example 1. For strings w, let Mw denote the TM with code w. Let T0(n), T1(n), . . . be a computable enumeration of time
bounds. Then {w|Mw works in time Tk(n) for some k} ∈ Σ2. (This generalizes the example due to Hajék [10] for the cases
of polynomial time with/without fixed degree.) Simply design a red–green TMM which on inputw operates as follows.M
starts in red and carries out phases k = 0, 1, . . . in which it (a) switches to green, (b) generates the code for computing
Tk(n) by enumeration, and (c) simulates Mw on all inputs x one after the other for Tk(|x|) steps until it encounters an x for
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whichMw needsmore steps. If the latter case does not arise,w ∈ L andM indeed accepts it. If the latter case arises, machine
M stops checking, switches to red, and moves to phase k+ 1. This proves that L is red–green recognizable, thus inΣ2.
2.3. Nondeterminism
We now turn to nondeterministic red–green computing. Can it be characterized as well and, does it give advantages over
deterministic computing?
A very effective way to represent the computations (‘runs’) of a nondeterministic red–green TMM on inputw is given by
the computation tree ofM onw. This is the infinite tree T (we omitM andw as explicit subscripts) in which (a) every node
corresponds to the configuration after a finite run ofM on w, (b) the root corresponds to the initial configuration ofM on
w, and (c) if C is the configuration associated to any node v, then v’s sons uniquely and precisely correspond to a successor
configuration of C after applying an option of the nondeterministic next move to C.
Because we assumed nondeterministic machines always to have one or two options available (only) in any
nondeterministic move, T is an infinite tree with all nodes having one or two sons only. Also, because M is a red–green
TM, we can associate a unique colour to every node of T = TM,w: red if the node corresponds to a configuration with a red
state, green if it corresponds to a configuration with a green state.
Fact. T has no leaves at finite depth. The infinite paths in T from the root down correspond precisely to the possible runs ofM
on w. The string w is recognized if and only if T has an infinite path from the root down that is all green from some finite level
onward.
The basic observation for nondeterministic red–green TMs is the following. In the proof we use the notion of a cut of T .
Definition 8. A cut of T is any finite set of red nodes such that (a) no node in the set is an ancestor of another, and (b) every
path from the root down must hit a node in the set.
A cut separates T in a part above and below the cut. Viewing every node in the cut as the root of the infinite subtree below
it, the nodes of a cut ‘span’ the entire tree below the cut.
Theorem 3. Let L be the set of strings recognized by a nondeterministic red–green TM. Then L can also be recognized by a
deterministic red–green TM.
Proof (Sketch). Let L be recognized by nondeterministic red–green TM M, and w some input. The idea is to perform
a combined breadth-first (BFS) and depth-first search (DFS) of the computation tree of M on w. The DFS is used for
‘‘in-depth’’ inspection of subtrees with a green root and discovering possible infinite green paths in them, whereas the
BFS is used for inspecting the remaining red nodes.
More precisely, design a deterministic red–green TMN as follows.N works in successive phases j = 1, 2, . . . for as long
as it goes. At the beginning of phase j, N has marked a cut of T (e.g. as a linked list of nodes from the left end of T to the
right end), with the part above the cut finite and explored and the part below the cut still unexplored. The initial condition
is certainly satisfied at the beginning of the initial phase (j = 1), where we assume thatN start with the cut consisting just
of the root of T (a red node). If the machine has gotten to phase j, let the cut it got to consist of nodes v1, v2, . . . and the
machine be in red. The machine now proceeds as follows:
Phase j:
– switch to green.
– inspect the nodes v1, v2, . . . from left to right and try to construct a next lower cut of the tree as follows. Say we
have constructed the beginning part w1, w2, . . . , ws of the next cut. Let vt (some t ≥ 1) be the next node of the
current cut to be considered.
– expand vt , say into nodes vt,0 and vt,1. If vt,0 is red, append it to the list of the next cut and consider vt,1.
– if vt,0 is green, it may be the starting node of an infinite green path. We call the DFS part to try and find it, while
staying in green:
– expand (the tree below) vt,0 by DFS: whenever a green node is encountered, the DFS continues to expanding to
lower nodes, and when a red node is encountered the DFS backs up and the red node is appended to the list of
the next cut.
– if the DFS backs up to vt,0 again and vt,0 has no unexplored sons anymore, then the DFS ends.
– handle vt,1 in the same way.
– if (the subtree below) vt,1 is handled, proceed with the BFS to vt+1 if it exists. If the cut is depleted, switch to red
(!) and exit the phase.
If a green node e.g. vt,0 in the description above is expanded in a phase, two things can happen: either there is an infinite
green path starting at vt,0 or there is not. In the former case, the search will guideN to the lexicographically first green path
and the DFS will continue forever, staying in green despite that some finite branches ending at a red node may get entered
every once in a while). In the case that there is no infinite green path starting at vt,0, the DFS will eventually end and the BFS
process will proceed to the next node of the cut. It follows that during phase j, either an infinite green path is found andN
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stays in this phase in green forever, or the phase is completed in finite time, with a switch to red at the end and a new deeper
cut of T constructed as starting condition for phase j+ 1. The entire phase is carried out in green and only if the phase ends
is finite time, a mind change is taking place in entering the next phase.
Ifw ∈ L, then in some phase j an infinite green path will be found andN indeed recognizesw after having made at most
finitely many mind changes. If w ∉ L the latter cannot happen. In this case, every phase will end after finitely many steps
(and at least one mind change) andN will go through next phases without end, with infinitely many mind changes.
We conclude thatN is a deterministic red–green TM that recognizes L. 
3. Mind change complexity
In this Section we study (a) the computational potential red–green TMs that make at most a constantly bounded number
of mind changes, and (b) the connection between red–green TMs and relativistic computing. We will also argue that e.g.
Pmind ( ∆2.
3.1. Bounding the number of mind changes
Wewill show that red–green TMs that recognize (thus accept) their inputs after at most kmind changes, for some fixed
constant k, precisely characterize the classesΣ−1k of the Boolean Hierarchy due to Ershov [5]. Putnam ([18], Theorem 2) gave
a similar characterization by means of his k-trial predicates, in purely functional terms only (cf. [15], p. 374).
Note that Σ−1k ⊆ ∆2 for every k, and that ∪∞k=0Σ−1k is the Boolean closure of the class of recursively enumerable sets.
The sets in a classΣ−1k are also called the k-r.e. sets and can be described as follows.
Definition 9. An k-r.e. set is any set A that can be written as the symmetric difference of k r.e. sets. Alternatively, A is k-r.e.
if there are k r.e. sets A1, . . . , Ak such that for any stringw:w ∈ A if and only ifw ∈ Ai for an odd number of indices i.
Theorem 4. For any k ≥ 1, L is the set of strings accepted by a red–green TM within k mind changes if and only if L is an k-r.e.
set.
Proof. (⇒) Let L be accepted by a red–green TMM within at most kmind changes. We construct k r.e. sets A1, . . . , An such
thatw ∈ L if and only ifw belongs to an odd number of Ais.
Design a TMN that starts with each Ai = ∅ and generates the stringsw ∈ Σ∗ one after the other, adding eachw to some
of Ai’s as needed. The basic idea is this. For each input w,N runs a simulation of machineM on w. WhenM switches over
to a green state, we add w to A1. Each time whenM makes another mind change, we add w to the next Ai. This continues
until we addw to Ak the latest. The construction guarantees that all Ai are recursively enumerable.
Note that when the computation ofM onw will converge to green (red) within the allowed number of mind changes, it
means that w ∈ L (w ∉ L) and w has been assigned to an odd (even, respectively) number of sets. This shows that L is the
symmetric difference of the Ai, i.e. that L is a n-r.e. set.
(⇐) Now let L be k-r.e. set, and let A1, . . . , Ak be r.e. sets such that w ∈ L if and only if w belongs to an odd number of
Ais. LetN1, . . . ,Nk+1 be the k+ 1 TMs recognizing the respective r.e. sets.
Construct a red–green TMM that works as follows. On input w,M starts a simultaneous simulation of N1, . . . ,Nk+1
on this input. Depending on the termination of any of the Ni, M does the following. As usual it starts computing in red.
Whenever a Ni terminates (signalling that w ∈ Ai),M switch colour and continues simulating (or just converging if all Ni
happened to have terminated). Note thatM canmake atmost kmind changes and, as stringsw ∈ L belong to an odd number
of Ai andw ∉ L do not,M ends up in green precisely whenw ∈ L. 
Thus, the computational potential of red–green TMs that make at most a constantly bounded number of mind changes
is completely characterized, namely by the level sets of the Boolean Hierarchy. Theorem 4 also follows from Lemma 1 by
characterizing theΣ−1k sets as sets of the form (A1 − A2) ∪ (A2 − A3) ∪ · · · ∪ (Ak − Ak+1), for recursively enumerable sets
A1, . . . , Ak+1. The following observation is immediate.
Theorem 5. For any odd k ≥ 1 there exist sets in∆2 which can be accepted by a red–green TM within k+ 1 mind changes but
not by any red–green TM within k mind changes.
3.2. About Pmind and computing with oracle calls
Having characterized the power of red–green TMs that only make a up to a constant number of mind changes, we turn
to the more general case. First consider the case of a polynomially bounded number of mind changes.
Theorem 6. For every computable function f , MIND[f ] ( ∆2. In particular, Pmind ( ∆2.
Proof. Red–green TMs that recognize their strings in a computably bounded number of mind changes, can keep a count of
their number of mind changes and observe whether this number goes over the bound or not. Thus, they can be assumed to
work as acceptors. Nowapply Theorem2 (ii). Strict inclusion follows by a diagonal argument similar to that in Theorem5. 
J. van Leeuwen, J. Wiedermann / Theoretical Computer Science 429 (2012) 202–212 209
Relativistic computing
Several years ago a type of computing was proposed that allowed the use of explicit ‘infinite time subroutines’ and result
signals of these calls returning in ‘finite time’. The model was motivated by a possible physical reality according to general
relativity theory and was called relativistic computing [6]. We showed that relativistic computers accept exactly the ∆2
sets and developed a complexity theory for these machines when operating within polynomial space [29] (see also [28]).
Theorem 2(ii) immediately gives us a concrete realistic ‘model’ equivalent to relativistic computing.
Theorem 7. Relativistic computers are equivalent to red–green TM acceptors: both accept precisely the∆2 sets.
Relativistic computers are almost by definition equivalent to (oracle) TMs that are allowed to carry out at most finitely
many yes/no-calls to the Halting Problem. Thus Theorem 7 is essentially equivalent to Post’s theorem ([15], Proposition
IV.1.16) and expresses a characterization similar to Shoenfield’s Limit Lemma ([15], Proposition IV.1.17), now in the far
more flexible and expressive formalism of red–green acceptors. It was shown by Beigel [1] that TMs with n+ 1 calls to the
Halting Problem compute a strictly larger set of partial functions than TMs with n calls to the Halting Problem.
Relating mind change and oracle call complexity
Theorem 7 resolves the standing question to characterize relativistic computing by a machine model that fits more
realistically in the existing paradigm of infinite computation. In fact, one can show that the characterization can be proved
directly in machine terms, with the advantage that it leads to a direct proof of Post’s theorem that explicitly links the
complexity of the models. The proof relates (connects) the realistic measure of converge time complexity in red–green
TMs to the not-so-realistic measure of oracle call complexity in TMs that are recursive in K (thus relativistic computers).
Theorem 8. The oracle call complexity of relativistic computers and the mind change complexity of red–green TM acceptors are
linearly bounded in each other.
The interesting conclusion we can draw is that relativistic computing essentially coincides with red–green acceptors in
capabilities. Thus one can study the former by studying the latter which, in a sense, allows for a more direct computational
analysis.
It follows that red–green TMs are the ‘infinitistic’ realization of relativistic computing, placing the latter clearly in the
spectrum of hypercomputation.
4. Nondeterminism and mind change complexity
We now return to the study of nondeterministic red–green TMs. Recall that the machines recognize exactly theΣ2 sets.
What can one say more in particular about nondeterministic red–green TMs and their behaviour? Again some familiar
recursion-theoretic facts will reappear in the new computational context of these machines and their analysis.
4.1. Simulating nondeterminism
In Section 2.3we proved that nondeterministic red–green TMs are nomore powerful than their deterministic version.We
left it open to relate the mind change complexity of the deterministic simulation to that of the nondeterministic machine.
Here we add a further observation.
A nondeterministic red–green TM, operating on input w and accepting this input by admitting a computation on w
which converges to all green in finite time, can in theory admit every other type of computation onw as well: it may admit
computations that do not stabilize at all (thusmaking an unbounded number ofmind changes as the computation proceeds),
and it may in fact even admit computations that eventually stabilize in red (which thus does not necessarily say anything
about acceptance of the input). We now consider nondeterministic red–green TMs which do not admit the latter type of
computations when accepting a string.
Definition 10. A nondeterministic red–green TMM is called non-ambiguous if on all recognized inputsw,M does not admit
any computations that converge to all red.M is called ambiguous otherwise.
Non-ambiguous (nondeterministic) red–green TMs can never have accepting runs (converging to green) and ‘rejecting’ runs
(converging to red) simultaneously, but accepting runs and divergent runs (with infinitelymanymind changes) are allowed.
We do not care how the machine behaves on inputs that are not recognized.
Theorem 9. Let L be the set of strings recognized by a non-ambiguous nondeterministic red–green TM within mind change
complexity MC(w). Then L can be recognized by a deterministic red–green TM within the same mind change complexity MC(w).
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Proof (Sketch). Let L be recognized by a non-ambiguous nondeterministic red–green TMM and w some input. As in the
proof of Theorem 2 we will construct a deterministic red–green TM N that explores the computation tree T = TM,w from
the root down in a particular way.
Let us first assume that w is a recognized input, i.e. T contains an infinite path that is all green from some finite level
on down but, by non-ambiguity, T does not contain any path that is all red from some level onward. The latter implies that
along every path, every consecutive stretch of red nodes is necessarily finite. This suggest the following modification of the
procedure described in Theorem 2.
AgainN will reconstruct and explore T in phases, in every phase ‘moving’ a cut of T to a next cut of T , with the possibility
that in doing so the DFS hits on an infinite green path. However, this timeN will have red and green phases alternating and
phases have a slightly different initial condition.N begins in a red phase, with a (red) cut consisting of the root of T (only).
Then the phases proceed as follows:
– red phases begin with a red cross cut C . The nodes of the cut are expanded in red in BFS/DFS fashion, where nodes
are expanded all thewayuntil green nodes are reached along the entire search frontier. Greennodeswill eventually
be reached along all search paths in finitely many steps, by the non-ambiguity of M. When all (red) nodes are
explored from left to right, the red phase ends. Accumulating the green nodes along the search front in a list from
left to right will result in another cut C ′, this time consisting of green nodes only.When the red phase has ended,N
will switch to the next phase, whichwill be a green phase. (Observe that the tree from C ‘down to but not including’
C ′ consists entirely of red nodes and that it is in a sense the maximal such region from C on downward.) Entering
a green phase is accompanied by switching to green.
– green phases begin with a green cross cut C . The nodes of the cut are expanded in green in BFS/DFS fashion, in
exactly the same way as described in the proof of Theorem 2. Now the nodes are expanded up to the red nodes
reached and this leads to another cut C ′, unless the process hits on an infinite green path which keeps the DFS
going indefinitely (in green). If we do not hit on an infinite green path in this phase, the phase will end in finite
time, with a new cut C ′ now consisting entirely of red nodes. N will then switch to red and to the next phase,
which will be a red phase again. (Observe that if the phase is finite, the tree from C ‘down to but not including’ C ′
consists entirely of green nodes and that it is in a sense themaximal such region from C on downward. If the phase
is not finite, it will essentially trace the lexicographically first infinite green path from some node in C downward.)
Clearly N will recognize w precisely in a green phase, sufficiently far into the simulation. Considering any recognizing
path π for w down T and the succession of red and green segments on it, one observes that the phases of the simulation
reconstruct and include the successive segments as they alternate until (or unless) a phase becomes infinite because it hits
on an infinite green path. It follows that the number of mind changes occurring during the simulation is precisely MC(w).
The entire procedure can be coded for a red–green TM.
Now assume thatw is not a recognized input. Consider the procedure as described above. Clearly there is no chance now
to hit on an infinite green path, i.e. green phases will always be finite now. However, the simulation does not necessarily
give an infinite alternation of red and green now: it can now happen that the simulation hits on an infinite red path while
in a red phase, which will make the phase infinite and the computation converge in red. But in either case it implies thatw
is not recognized. Thus the recognition process is correctly simulated. 
Several conditions other than non-ambiguity can be given which allow for a simulation result similar to Theorem 9.
4.2. Complexity consequences
What is the real impact of the machine-based notion of nondeterminism for the case of red–green TMs? We first prove
a simple, but crucial observation that shows why the unrestricted notion is crushing the complexity concept we have been
using.
Lemma 3. Every set of strings L ∈ Σ2 can be recognized by a nondeterministic red–green TM within one mind change.
Proof. Let L ∈ Σ2. This implies that there is a recursive predicate F(x, y, w) such thatw ∈ L ⇔ ∃x∀yF(x, y, w). To recognize
stringsw of L one can thus design a nondeterministic red–green TMM that operates as follows. On inputw, themachine first
‘nondeterministically’ generates some arbitrary string x in red, it then switches to green and starts verifying by enumeration
that for every x indeed F(x, y, w) holds. If the predicate always holds, then M will converge in green and recognizes w
correctly, after only one mind change. If the machine encounters an x for which F(x, y, w) does not hold, then the machine
switches back to red and stays in red forever.M clearly nondeterministically recognizes L. 
Corollary 1. For every function g with g(w) ≥ 1, ND_MIND[g] = Σ2.
Comparing Lemmas 2 and 3, it follows that nondeterminism precisely causes the step up from Σ1 to Σ2. Mind change
complexity is a way to fill the computational gap only in the deterministic case. We draw some straightforward conclusions
from the elaborations.
Theorem 10. For every function g, MIND[g] ( ND_MIND[1]. In particular Pmind ( NPmind.
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Proof. By Theorem 2,MIND[g] ⊂ ∆2. By Lemma 3, ND_MIND[1] = Σ2. The result follows. 
Corollary 2. There is no computable function f such that for all sets of strings L, if L is recognized by a nondeterministic red–green
TM within k mind changes, then L can be recognized by a deterministic red–green TM within f (k)mind changes.
Another observation can be made, based on the analysis in Section 4.1. It gives a concrete fact for the complexity of
nondeterministic machines that recognize sets of strings beyond Pmind in a polynomially bounded number of mind changes.
A similar fact can be stated for nondeterministic red–green TMs recognizing set of strings in Σ2 − MIND[f ] within f (|w|)
mind changes
Corollary 3. Any nondeterministic red–green TM recognizing a set of strings in NPmind − Pmind within polynomially many mind
changes is necessarily ambiguous, i.e. must have inputsw on which it has both accepting runs (converging to green) and rejecting
runs (converging to red).
Proof. Consider any language L ∉ Pmind. Suppose L could be recognized by a non-ambiguous, nondeterministic red–green
machine. By Theorem 9, L can also be recognized deterministically within polynomially many mind changes. By Theorem 6,
L ∈ Pmind. Contradiction. 
5. Conclusions
What would the concept of computability look like if it were invented today? In all likelihood a step-level computational
mechanism would be modelled in some way equivalent to classical TMs, if we may believe the Church-Turing thesis. But
computations as conceived of and programmed today, have a number of features that extend beyond pure calculation. In
this study we have specifically addressed the issue of perpetuating computations. How can they be modelled and to what
theoretical framework do they lead? Models of unbounded computation have been studied in the past, often obtained by
allowing finite machines to compute ‘forever’ and defining the behaviour over infinite input strings (ω-sequences) in some
way. We have tried to start from first principles, and on finite inputs.
The model of unbounded computation we presented, derives from an idealized notion of multi-process computation.
The model leads to red–green Turing machines and several measures to assess their complexity. Red–green TMs allow an
escape from finite to unbounded computation in a way that is both credible and amenable to computational analysis. At the
same time there may be didactic advantages to the model, compared to other approaches.
The notion of mind change complexity gives a way to measure unbounded computations and enables a characterization
of the ‘jump’ in computational power achieved by going to unboundedness, a jump from the first to the second level of the
Arithmetical Hierarchy. Themodel can be seen as a concretemotivation to consider problems up to∆2 or evenΣ2 computable
‘by an unbounded process’. The extension to higher levels is tempting e.g. by superimposing alternation. This is open for
further study although it would lead away by yet another step from the basic principle of computation as an unbounded
process studied here. Connections between computational models and the higher levels of the Arithmetical Hierarchy have
been found before (see e.g. [13,22]) but the model of red–green TMs seems to be more insightful.
Interestingly, themodel of red–green TMs subsumes several existing recursion-theoretic models in the literature such as
trial and error predicates [18] and limiting recursion [7,8]. Themodel can even be related to Turing’s fundamental 1936 paper,
by interpreting it as the non-terminating version of Turing’s circular a-machines. The model gives a concrete computational
context and allows a complexity-theoretic analysis. For example, the model allows for a re-appraisal of the Kleene-Post
characterization of ∆2 and Σ2 and a programmer’s proof of it using red–green machines which also gives a quantitative
relationship between the oracle call complexity of the former and the mind change complexity of the latter. We have
specifically exploited the model to define the notion of nondeterminism in unbounded computation, showing that it can
always be simulated deterministically but with an anomalous effect on mind change complexity. The Pmind ≠ NPmind result
is an example for the different intuitions in (nondeterministic) red–green computation. Nondeterministic red–green TMs
that recognize sets in polynomially manymind changes that nonetheless do not belong to Pmind, are necessarily ‘ambiguous’
in the sense defined in Section 4.
An additional benefit of red–green TMs is that they provide a concrete implementation of the notion of ‘relativistic
computation’, proposed a number of years ago [6]. It was shown before that relativistic computation essentially is
computation at the level of ∆2 [29,28] but it remained open to determine a realistic model for it in the realm of
hypercomputation. Red–green computation is a possible answer. In an extension of our current study we have defined a
higher-order version to capture the entire Arithmetical Hierarchy in feasible term of hypercomputability.
The further analysis of red–green TMs might involve not only a further study of mind change complexity and other
measures, but also of a time-evolving notion of space complexity. The most useful features of red–green TMs seem be those
that enable a quantization of the unbounded behaviour in finitistic terms.
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